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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I examine how the specific nature of economic integration in the European Union 
has affected member states’ redistribution policies over the last two decades. More precisely, I 
attempt to detail the effect of social-tax competition between member states within social mod-
els, processes that I label “races to bottoms.” In this framework, I identify the emergence of an 
informal set of rules effectively constraining national redistribution policies in different ways, 
given the diversity of tax-social compacts in the EU. Because these rules are implicit and their ef-
fect generally underestimated, I gather them under the notion of “shadow” social Europe. Hav-
ing empirically assessed the impact of this dynamic on the “continental,” the “Nordic,” the 
“eastern” and the “liberal” social-tax compact, I finally try to present a normative perspective 
and some policy options on this matter. 
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 “Under the rule of individual property, the division of the produce is the result of two determining agen-
cies: Competition, and Custom. It is important to ascertain the amount of influence which belongs to each 
of these causes, and in what manner the operation of one is modified by the other.” 
Mill (1848) 
 
 
“[…] competition of the kind we now have in mind acts not only when in being but also when it is merely 
an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks.”  
 
Schumpeter (1942) 
 
 
“[…] only one thing is worse than being exploited by capital, and that is not being exploited by it.” 
 
Genschel (2004) 
 
I.  Prologue: the constitution of the EU 
 
As much as the ideas of “Europe” and “constitution” have been associated in the recent period, 
the constitutional perspective has generally been overlooked while assessing the state of Euro-
pean integration. 
 
European economic and social policies are indeed constrained by a consistent and ordered set of 
rules that can be though of both positively and normatively as a constitution (see Laurent & Le 
Cacheux, 2006). Some of those rules are explicit and written, such as the European central bank 
statutes, or the Stability and Growth Pact deficit and debt criteria. Some are implicit and infor-
mal. This paper is concerned with this latter type of European rules.  
 
Because the Treaty of Rome (1957) drew a clear frontier between economic and social policies, it 
is often believed that European integration is somewhat schizophrenic. On the one hand mem-
ber states share their national sovereignty by pursuing common economic policies; on the other 
hand they remain absolutely sovereign in the conduct of social policies. This frontier, if it existed 
in the very first decades of the European integration, has become imaginary since the Single Act 
(1986) came partially to reality with the achievement of the Single Market (1993). The gap be-
tween fiction and reality has widened in the course of the preparation and advent of the single 
currency. Actually, the Treaty of Rome itself explicitly aimed at this spill-over of economic inte-
gration onto social policies:   
 
“Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an im-
proved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the im-
provement is being maintained. 
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the com-
mon market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the proce-
dures provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action.”1
                                                          
1Article 117, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (non-consolidated version), emphases added. 
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This vision has come into full effect, but with little acknowledgement. The European economic 
constitution (see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2006) now constrains social as well as economic policies. 
Yet, an interesting distinction does persist between the economic and social provisions of this 
corpus. The peculiarity of social provisions, unlike most of the economic ones,2 is that they have 
not resulted from a conscious and deliberate choice by member states, but from their lack of de-
cision in the social domain and their contrasting resolution in the economic one. Moreover, the 
explicit set of soft rules referred to as “Social Europe” – the most recent byproduct of which is 
the “open method of coordination” brought about by the Lisbon summit in March 2000 – has far 
less impact on national redistribution policies than the processes studied in this paper, implied 
by the pace and asymmetric nature of European integration. Hence, the true “social Europe” re-
mains in the shadows.  
 
The present paper is ordered as follows: it starts by characterizing the nature of European inte-
gration in markets and policies as a three-dimensional process (Section 2). It then briefly looks 
back at the economic dynamic that gave birth to European social-tax compacts (“races to tops”) 
in the context of the first globalization (Section 3). Section 4 gives analytical substance to the no-
tion of “races to bottoms” within European social-tax models. Section 5 assesses empirically the 
impact of the “European races to bottoms.” Section 6 finally presents some normative perspec-
tive and contemplates European policy options. 
 
                                                          
2Again, see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2006. 
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II.  A portrait of European integration in three dimensions 
 
Too often, the state of the public debate on economic and social policies in the EU remains “pre-
Keynesian.” By this is meant that most economic and social variables (growth, unemployment, 
inequalities, etc.) are restrictively considered from the sole perspective of the dynamic of the la-
bor market. As noted by Fitoussi & Leijonhufvud (2002), the major intuition of Keynes in the af-
termath of the Great Depression was that unemployment could well have another origin than 
the labor market, so that macroeconomic policies and social policies had to be analyzed together 
in order to accurately understand and possibly remedy recessions, downturns and their dra-
matic consequences. This analysis stood in opposition to the partial equilibrium vision of Jac-
ques Rueff in particular and neo-classical economists in general.  
 
In an unfortunate throwback to pre-Keynesianism, the poor economic performance of the EU for 
the last fifteen years seems to have no other major explanation for many contemporary authors 
than inefficient labor markets.3 Yet, in order to properly characterize the state of European inte-
gration and its impact (its depth and nature), one has to reason in three dimensions by consider-
ing the labor market as well as the capital market and the product market. What is more, the EU 
integration regime goes far beyond a collection of integrated markets. It also entails an inte-
grated order of policies that gives markets coherence but also puts them into a hierarchical or-
der. What is the state of integration in the EU when considered in “3D?” 
 
First and foremost, as shown in Chart I, the EU has successfully instituted a market for goods 
among its member states, more than any region in the world. Intra-European trade in goods is 
also very dynamic in the most recent period while intra-regional trade tends to slow down or 
stagnate elsewhere.  
 
Chart I. EUROPEANIZATION WITHIN GLOBALIZATION: TRADE 
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Source : WTO. 
 
                                                          
3The most recent references include Sapir et al. (2003) and Kok (2004). See Fitoussi (2002), Creel, Laurent & 
Le Cacheux (2005) and Martin & Ross (2004) for a critique. 
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Chart II shows that, contrary to beliefs expressed most recently during the debate on the direc-
tive on services, trade in services not only is more important in the EU than in the rest of the 
world, but it is also as dynamic. However, by the simple fact that many services are not tradable, 
trade in services remains a fraction, albeit rising, of total trade in the EU (and the world). 
 
Chart II. EUROPEANIZATION WITHIN GLOBALIZATION: SERVICES 
 
Share of services trade in total trade in 2004  
(billion $ and %) 
 World EU 25 
   
Merchandise 
   
Exports 2100 1005 
Imports 2081 948 
Average 2090,5 976,5 
   
   
Commercial services 
  
Exports 8880 3708 
Imports 9215 3784 
Average 9047,5 3746 
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Source: WTO and author’s calculations. 
 
Regarding factors of production, capital is clearly circulating at a very high speed in the EU. But 
the important and often understated reality is that if capital is obviously more mobile than any 
other product or factor (cf. infra), it is also more mobile in the EU than anywhere else in the 
world in a global context of capital mobility’s acceleration, approximated by convergence of 
long-term interest rates (see Chart III). 
 
As is well known, the state of integration of labor markets is by far the weakest in the EU, which 
is hardly surprising given the persistence of the obstacle of language. The European Commis-
sion reports that “approximately 1.5% of EU-25 citizens live and work in a different Member 
State from their country of origin – a proportion that has hardly changed for the last 30 years.” 
In terms of general residential mobility, it adds that “every year on average 7.2% of EU citizens 
change their place of residence, of which 15% refer to a change in job as the main reason for the 
move. This compares to 16.2 percent of U.S. citizens moving home each year, 17% for occupa-
tional reasons.”4
 
Fligstein & Merand (2002) have collected similar evidence as to the depth of European integra-
tion. They go so far as to argue that what we call “globalization” is actually in great part “Euro-
peanization,” and conclude that European (sovereign) states have played a major role in build-
ing markets for European firms. While the first conclusion is obviously supported by the empiri-
cal evidence gathered in this paper, the second is not. European integration means more than 
product or factor integration. European member states have developed an impressive set of inte-
grated policies, although it remains incomplete and even incoherent when assessed through the 
lens of the theory of regional integration (see Table I).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4“Labour markets in the 21 st Century,” a joint U.S. & EU conference, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, September 2002, http://europa.eu.int/eracareers/index_en.cfm
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Chart III. EUROPEANIZATION WITHIN GLOBALIZATION: CAPITAL 
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*EU is EU 15 until 2000 and EU 25 from 2001 onwards; flows are the average of intra-EU FDI inflows and 
outflows. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table I. EUROPEANIZATION WITHIN GLOBALIZATION: POLICY INTEGRATION 
INTEGRATION STEPS ACCORDING TO 
BALASSA’S5 TYPOLOGY 
IMPLEMENTATION & TYPE OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY REQUIRED 
COMPLETION & VALIDITY IN THE 
EURO ZONE AS OF 2006 
 
Free-trade area - Revocation of all customs duties 
and quotas. 
 
- Achieved (between 1961  
and 1968). 
Customs union - Common external tariff; 
 
- Common trade policy. 
- Achieved (in 1968) ; 
 
- Enforced. 
Common market - Free movement of goods; 
 
- Free movement of capital; 
 
- Free movement of services; 
 
- Free movement of labor; 
 
- Free competition policy. 
 
- Achieved since 1993; 
 
- Achieved since 1993; 
 
- Incomplete; 
 
- Incomplete; 
 
- Enforced. 
Economic union - Economic integration; 
 
- Economic policy coordination; 
 
- Structural adjustment. 
 
- Incomplete; 
 
- Partly achieved; 
 
 
- Partly achieved. 
Economic and monetary union - Economic and financial union; 
 
- Unification of monetary policy & 
single currency; 
 
- Unification of taxation policy; 
 
 
- Unification of fiscal policy; 
- Incomplete; 
 
- Achieved in 1999; 
 
 
- Incomplete; 
 
 
- Incomplete. 
Source: Fitoussi & Laurent (2004), adapted from Balassa, B. (1961), The Theory of Economic Integration. 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
 
The general picture of European integration in three dimensions is thus a contrasted one, as 
represented on Chart IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5This typology was proposed by Balassa in 1961 to identify the successive steps of a coherent regional eco-
nomic integration from a basic free trade area to the eventual introduction of a single currency. 
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Chart IV. THE EU IN “3D:” AN ASYMMETRIC INTEGRATION 
 
Tax & social policies
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At first glance, the European order of integration seems logical. Mobility (of inputs and outputs) 
corresponds to (policy) centralization, immobility is linked with decentralization. The three di-
mensions of European integration (market of capital, product and labor) can be reconstituted by 
associating inputs and outputs on the one hand (ranked on the immobility/ mobility axis) and 
policies on the other (ranked on the federal/national axis). In accordance with the data pre-
sented supra, the capital market is the most integrated, the product market is in an intermediary 
state of integration and the labor market is the least integrated of all.  
 
Yet, since economic policies and social policies are interdependent in the EU – fiscal policy (bud-
getary and tax policy), which is only intermediately centralized, being the main locus of this 
interdependence – this apparent logic runs into trouble. It gives way to an implicit hierarchy 
whereby what is mobile constrains what is immobile and what is centralized constrains what is 
decentralized (the direction of this influence is represented by the arrow). To put it differently, 
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European member states face a “new trilemma” between mobility, sovereignty and policy inte-
gration (Chart V).  
 
If the previous European trilemma (Mundell’s “triangle of incompatibility” between capital mo-
bility, fixed exchange rates and autonomous monetary policy) was institutionally resolved with 
the abandonment of sovereign monetary policy through the creation of the single currency, the 
new trilemma (between an even higher capital mobility, totally fixed exchange rates, i.e., the sin-
gle currency, and autonomy of social-tax policy) is for now de facto resolved by the heteronomy 
of social-tax policy (see following sections).  
 
Before turning to the detail of this constraint by mobility through tax and social integration, a 
brief detour through the economic history of the constitution of European welfare states during 
the “first globalization” is likely to help us understand the dynamic interplay between factor 
mobility, products mobility and redistribution policies.  
 
Chart V. THE NEW EUROPEAN TRILEMMA 
The old European trilemma (Mundell’s triangle of incompatibility) 
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(exchange-rate speculations) 
Capital controls 
AUTONOMY OF  
MONETARY POLICY 
 
MOBILE CAPITAL FIXED EXCHANGE RATE 
 
Single Market 
 
The new European trilemma 
  
“Economic Patriotism” 
 
Single Market 
AUTONOMY OF  
SOCIAL-TAX POLICY
 
MOBILE CAPITAL 
 
 
FIXED EXCHANGE RATE  Instable EMU 
(social-tax competition) 
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III.   “Social Europe” before Europe: “races to tops” in the “first globalization”  
 
If we are to shed light on the economic dynamic at work and the pressures exerted on European 
welfare states in the course of European integration, a good starting point might be the analysis 
of the constitution of European welfare states during the first globalization.  
 
Atkinson (2004) has established that the welfare state was constituted, although not in its full fi-
nancial dimension,6 in response to the booming trade and financial integration between 1870 
and 1914. Building on this general argument, there are (at least) three consistent and compatible 
stories on the formation of European welfare states during this era.  
 
Formalizing and empirically substantiating the analysis of Heckscher & Ohlin (1933) and later 
Stolper & Samuelson (1941), Williamson (2002), on the basis of earlier work conducted with 
O’Rourke (O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999), shows how mass migration induced a convergence in 
wages and standards of living during the first globalization between the old and the new world 
and within the new world. In particular, he argues that North-North mass migrations can ac-
count for 70 percent of the convergence between industrialized countries in terms of income per 
capita, leaving only 30 percent to other forces, among which capital integration. He also shows 
how protection and social legislation have been instituted to protect those standards of living  in 
the face of trade integration.  
 
Trade expansion and labor mobility thus induced wages and standards of living convergence 
across the Atlantic and within Europe with the eventual need to “compensate losers” from glo-
balization effects by protecting them more efficiently from economic and employment insecur-
ity, i.e., by building welfare states. This line of reasoning is quite similar to the “hypothesis of 
compensation,” according to which openness triggers protection (see Cameron, 1978 and Rod-
rik, 1998). Atkinson (2004) argues along the same line that “It was concern about the distribu-
tional impact of expanding trade and factor mobility that contributed to the setting in place of 
social security.” But this is only part of the story. 
 
Berger (2003) displays evidence that the mobility of workers played a great role in diffusing the 
ideas of the new social-tax compact across Europe, especially between France and Germany. 
This “yardstick competition” (see infra) can explain why a “race to the top” occurred in welfare 
programs between sovereign but interdependent national states instituting one after the other 
progressive tax systems and distribution policies. In the words of Berger: “[A]t least at the level 
of political rhetoric, there is evidence of emulation and learning across borders that seemed to 
encourage a virtuous cycle of rising standards of social welfare.”7  
  
But Berger’s main point is to show how the first globalization did not lead to “Social Europe.” 
The acceptance by French and European left-wing parties of international constraints did not re-
sult in the formation of an international or even a European welfare state, but national welfare 
models. The race to the top eventually became a “race to tops,” i.e., a separate building of redis-
tributive social-tax compacts along national idiosyncrasies. 
                                                          
6Which was achieved during the interwar and postwar period, two periods of relative economic disinte-
gration, see Tanzi, 2006. 
7“The First Globalization: Lessons from the French,” English version of Berger (2003), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/S.Berger.html
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Lindert (2004) finally points out the decisive role of the diffusion of democracy and the greater 
availability of “voice” for workers in the constitution of the welfare state in Europe (and else-
where). This final step is nothing short of crucial. The development of European welfare states 
was made possible by the development of European democracy. “Voice” was being heard as 
economic insecurity rose (see Lindert, 2004 and Laurent, 2005a). 
 
Taken together, these developments resulted in the constitution of European welfare states, as 
empirically documented in Chart VI.  
 
Chart VI. EUROPEAN RACES TO TOPS: THE EVIDENCE 
Introduction date of welfare states programs in 24 European countries 1880-1939 
 
Source: Atkinson (2004). 
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*Social spending includes welfare-unemployment, pensions, health and housing. Source: Lindert (1994). 
From this schematic presentation of the political economy of the constitution of European wel-
fare states, a question naturally emerges: why do these dynamics of integration seem to operate 
in reverse during the contemporary phase of “Europeanization?” If we can draw a line, as in 
Chart VII, from integration and mobility to convergence and upward competition and finally to 
redistribution, what is so different in the EU today? Why, as Atkinson (2002) rightly argues did 
“[G]lobalization pre-1914 [go] together with the introduction of the modern welfare state,” while 
“globalization today appears to presage its demolition?” 
 
The hypothesis of Williamson (2002) and Berger (2003) is that labor’s mobility has been the cor-
nerstone of the constitution of European welfare states during the first globalization. It will be 
argued in the next two sections that it is the mobility of capital that is mainly responsible for the 
constraint and possible demise of European welfare states in the contemporary period.  
 
Chart VII. EUROPEAN RACES TO TOPS: A SCENARIO 
 
Trade integration
Labor mobility
Convergence in wages and living 
standards across the Atlantic and 
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International and intra-national 
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IV.   “Races to bottoms” in the EU: a theory 
 
A broad way of characterizing the nature of the competition between states is to refer to it as an 
“institutional competition,” to distinguish it from “organizational competition.” This distinction 
draws on the definition given by North (1994) of “institution” (the “rules of the game”) and “or-
ganization” (the players of the game). States are players that have the power to change the rules 
of the game in order to compete with other states, something firms, for instance, do not have. 
 
This institutional competition between states develops primarily through “social-tax competi-
tion.”8 Since the seminal work by Tiebout (1956), a vast literature on tax competition has devel-
oped. The theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition alone is now quite large and 
continues to grow at high speed (see, for the general framework, Wilson, 1999, Oates, 1999 and 
Sinn, 2003 and for the EU, Le Cacheux et al. 1998, Le Cacheux, 2000, Le Cacheux & Saint-Etienne, 
2005, Cnossen, 2003, Zodrow, 2003 and Laurent 2005b). Yet, the idea behind the more inclusive 
concept of social-tax competition is that the distinction between tax and social policies has little 
meaning given the influence that one exerts on the other. The process triggered in the tax do-
main will eventually spill over onto social policies (cf. infra).  
 
Another way to insert the present paper in the literature is to say that among the many aspects 
now covered by the literature on tax competition, this paper is concerned with investigating the 
relation between mobility and redistribution. The exposition of the theoretical framework in 
which this investigation takes place can be found in Wildasin (2005), who tries at the same time 
to assess empirically the degree of economic integration and to detail the redistributive conse-
quences of what he calls “fiscal competition,9 and Cremer & Pestieau (2004).  
 
The missing global race to the bottom 
 
Empirical evidence of a social-tax “race to the bottom” in the world (and the EU) is reputed to be 
as scarce as the theoretical literature on it is abundant (see Winner, 2005 for an exception). The 
concern expressed in the 1990s of a disappearing welfare state in the face of global integration, 
as noted by Genschel (2002), does not seem to have been validated by reality.  
 
The usual argument for understanding this non-event is the so-called “frozen welfare state land-
scape” (Esping-Andersen, 1996) a variant of which may be “welfare resilience” (Pierson, 1996). 
For political economy reasons, the argument goes, nothing can really happen in modern welfare 
states, especially European ones. Yet, welfare states must cope with increasing pressures from 
global integration. Thus, the welfare state is caught up in a “permanent austerity” (Pierson, 
2001), between “irresistible forces” and “immovable objects” (Pierson, 1998).  
 
A less benign version of this constrained inertia is presented is Genschel (2002). In a counter-
factual argument, the author subtly attempts to show that tax competition has had effects not on 
what actually happened within tax and social systems but on what did not happen, i.e., the road 
not taken of fiscal and social viability. “The welfare state is not trapped in a race to the bottom 
but boxed in between external pressures to reduce the tax burden on capital, on one hand, and 
internal pressures to maintain revenue levels and relieve the tax burden on labor, on the other” 
                                                          
8The notion was introduced by Fitoussi (1999). 
9A concept designed to be more inclusive than tax competition, but still not encompassing social policies.  
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(Genschel, 2002). The author argues elsewhere along the same line that “[G]lobalization, rather 
than undermining the tax state, freezes it in its current form” (Genschel, 2005).  
 
Yet, another argumentative strategy other than counterfactual analysis can be developed to as-
sess the dynamic of states’ competition. It consists in acknowledging that the competition dy-
namic exists and that its effects have been felt, but they have not been correctly measured. Given 
the complexity of contemporary social-tax compacts, it is somewhat difficult to imagine that the 
effects of integration could be entirely and accurately captured by the mere evolution of total so-
cial expenditure or total tax revenues, as is often done in the literature.  
 
Hence, on a theoretical level, at least two hypotheses compete. The first states that tax competi-
tion induces a lower general tax burden and erodes tax revenues. The second, “the compensa-
tion hypothesis,” implies that tax competition leads to a higher tax burden (more openness trig-
gering more protection). To begin to grasp the true effect of social-tax competition, one has first 
productively to combine both theories. In a context of high economic integration, the tax burden 
is likely to be higher for immobile factors and lower for mobile factors. Further, this differenti-
ated pattern has to be itself differentiated given the fact that its pressure is exerted on various so-
cial models pursuing distinct objectives.  
 
Why and how the EU deserves a closer look 
 
Many studies on tax competition, even those acknowledging the importance of the phenomenon 
on a global level (see Winner, 2005), overlook the basic facts of European integration. Social-tax 
competition is more likely to occur where integration is strong; the effects of social-tax compe-
tition are more likely to be stronger when welfare states are more developed and close to each 
other; social-tax competition is more likely to occur where there is no other adjustment instru-
ment available in the face of integration and competition. These institutional features are exclu-
sively European.  
 
Indeed, variety is not a sufficient reason for competition. The stimulating theory of a new “sys-
tems competition” aimed at attracting “cross-border transfer of economic activities” because of 
globalization (Sinn, 2003) misses the simple point that national systems can cope with competi-
tion in globalization through the use of their economic policies. A much stronger effect is likely 
to take place when countries are part of an institutional regime where those instruments are not 
available anymore.  
 
The case for a closer look at the EU relies on two simple points. The EU is more integrated in 
terms of market than the world and its integration comprises policies on top of markets (see Sec-
tion 1). The EU has achieved integration between member states that themselves belong to social 
models.  
 
The European Union: integration in similar diversity 
 
For competition to develop, diversity has to coexist with integration. Integration in diversity is a 
key feature of the contemporary EU (see Scharpf, 2002). This matter of life is the result of the 
successive enlargements of the EU from 1957 onwards, since each enlargement enriched the 
European community (and then the EU) of a new social model.  
 
Full Bismarckian systems (“continental”) historically formed the first European social model. 
They were mixed with partial Berveridgian systems (“residual”) in 1973. The two were then as-
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sociated with partial Bismarckian systems (“Mediterranean”) in 1986 and, then, the three models 
were integrated with full Beveridgian systems (“Nordic”) in 1995.10 Ultimately, Eastern systems 
joined the others in 2004.  
 
It is no wonder that the EU today is the most developed and diverse integrated economic region 
of the world in terms of social-tax compacts (see Chart VIII).  
 
But if the EU deserves a closer look regarding social-tax competition, it should not be through 
the lens of inter-model competition. While the EU social debate in recent years has overwhelm-
ingly focused on the perils of competition between models (especially eastern and western 
ones), the study of the impact of competition within models has been neglected.  
 
If one would seek for a models’ convergence resulting from a “race to the bottom,” one would 
be making the same mistake than if one posited the existence of a “European social model.” 
Since the “European social model” does not exist (but European social models do), the quest for 
a race to the bottom is pursued in vain. But as argued supra, the disillusion has to go further. The 
question is not so much what is happening between the four models, than what is happening 
within the four models, between countries characterized by comparable social-tax compacts (in 
particular within the two most dynamic groups in terms of welfare reform, “Nordic” and “conti-
nental” countries). In this respect, the constant focus put on the question of the would-be East-
West race to the bottom has been misplaced.  
 
Chart VIII. SOCIAL-TAX COMPACTS IN THE EU: UNITY IN DIVERSITY 
*Series incomplete for Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Hungary.  Source: Eurostat. 
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10See Laurent (2005b) for the well-known rationale of the European social typology.  
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The myth of the European East-West race to the bottom 
 
The East-West social competition mythology relies on two pillars: one is the social standards 
competition, the other is the labor mobility driven competition.  
 
It is true that European economic competition used to be about social standards. The “dirty com-
petition” demonized by Germans jurists or the unfair competition disparaged by Mill was a 
trademark of the European nineteenth century. But this “social dumping” (see Alber & Stand-
ing, 2000) is not relevant for an analysis of the contemporary EU. The major reason why Euro-
pean competition is not about social standards anymore is because it has become an area where 
the EU has stepped in to enforce social legislation.11  
 
European competition is also only marginally triggered by labor mobility. In this respect, social-
tax competition in the EU is very different from the American variety of social competition, 
where labor migration plays a decisive role in triggering strategic interactions between states for 
fear of “welfare migration.”12 The recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice regard-
ing social regulation indeed indicates that “social tourism” is unlikely to develop in the EU (see 
Bosco, 2000). The Decker and Kohl decisions13 seem on the contrary to stabilize the institutional 
coexistence between welfare regimes reinforcing the very first provisions of the Treaty of Rome 
on social security of migrant workers. 
 
A powerful illustration of how weak the evidence is concerning labor mobility driven social-tax 
competition is given by the absence of economic and social dynamic triggered in the west of the 
EU by the eastern enlargement. It was supposed to imply mass migration as a result of an un-
precedented gap, this migration has not ap-
ened so far (see Chart IX). 
ial outflows from the EU 15. FDI flows have remained low between EU 15 and EU 10, contra-
),  the mobility of capital, the mobility of 
oods, and finally on the constraint put on macroeconomic policies. We can more effectively 
precedented gap in living standard. Despite the un h
p
 
Another striking feature of the 2004 enlargement is that it did not either provoke massive finan-
c
dicting the fear of massive outsourcing from West to East (see Chart X). This empirical evidence, 
as well as the dynamic of corporate taxation, will be used later on. For now, it simply signals 
that the (social) action is not taking place between (eastern and western) models.  
 
Summing up, it can be said that, if it exists, the European institutional competition is likely to 
rely on the immobility of labor (and not its mobility  14
g
capture the notion of European “races to bottoms” by referring to the literature on constitutional 
political economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11See Quintin & Favarel-Dapas (1999). 
12See Brueckner (2000) for a theoretical overview and applications in the context of the AFDC and the 
labor mobility based model of social-tax competition to European social diversity, 
welfare reform of 1996. 
13ECJ 28 April 1998, Decker-case C-120/95, ECJ 28 April 1998, Kohl-case C-158/96.  
14For an application of a 
see Cremer & Pestieau, 2003. 
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Chart IX. STANDARDS OF LIVING GAP AND LABOR MOBILITY  BETWEEN EU 10 AND EU 15 
GDP per capita in 2004 (EU 25=100) 
Luxembourg 226 Cyprus 83 
Ireland 137 Slovenia 79 
Netherlands 124 Czech Republic 70 
Austria 123 Malta 69 
Denmark 122   
Belgium 118 Hungary 60 
Sweden 117 Slovakia 52 
United Kingdom 116 Estonia 51 
Finland 112   
Germany 109 Poland 49 
France 109 Lithuania 48 
Italy 106 Latvia 43 
Spain 98   
Greece 82   
Portugal 72   
Average/mean EU 15 118/116 Average/mean EU 10 60/56 
Source: Eurostat. 
Economic/social migrations betwee “new” Europe 2003-2005 
                               Resident working age population 
 Origin 
 
n “old” and 
 
 
 
EU 10 
 
EU 15 
2003  2005 003 2004 2005 2004 2 
 
esD
    
tination 
 
  
EU 15 2,0 2,1 2,1 2 0,2 0,4 0,
       
EU 10 NA 0,2 0,2 NA 0,1 0,2 
       
Source:  Functioning of the Tr nal Arrangements set o 003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 
April 2 ss , 2006. 
 
X.  LABOR MOBILITY AND TAX COMPETITI WEEN EU 10 AND E
FDI Flows 2001-2003
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ew 0 0.8 0.5 .7 
 
Between EU 15 Members  
 
270.3 
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Source: Eurostat. 
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Tax competition between “old” “new” Europe 1995- and 2005 
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate in the EU 15 and EU 10
in %
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Competition as Constitution: the constitutional political economy of Social Europe 
 
Stressing the “the discipline of mobility,” Brennan & Buchanan (1980) note that: “Intergovern-
mental competition for fiscal resources and inter-jurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of 
‘fiscal gains’ can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on 
the taxing power.” In other words, because mobility triggers institutional competition, competi-
tion can be a substitute for an explicit constitutional constraint.  
 
Yet, it is important to understand that social-tax competition does not impose a single policy on 
states deeply involved in economic integration. It rather reduces available policy options to a de-
termined set of public policies, as a constitution would. By constraining the possible choices and 
reducing policy options (e.g., the difference between left and right parties once they come into 
power), competition acts as a constitution.  
 
European institutional competition is a competition by spillover. Private competition between 
organizations has triggered public competition between institutions. Before turning to the em-
pirical evidence, it is possible to sum up the concern of this paper, based on the previous sec-
tions. Given the asymmetric integration and rich similar diversity in social models of the EU, has 
an increase in private competition coupled with a constraint on public means triggered a public 
competition whose consequence is a constraint on redistribution policies?  
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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V.   Races to bottoms within the “continental,” “Nordic” and “Eastern” model: 
evidence 
principle and 
 the economy is integrated, the 
ore certain factors become mobile, the less they are likely to be taxed relative to more immobile 
escribed in this paper can hardly be seen as an effi-
ient way to “tame” Leviathans’ power to tax. Rather, it will merely shift the burden of taxation 
s, which are on aver-
ge toward more redistribution than in other regions of the world. They finally must abide by 
the common rules constraining their macroeconomic policies.  
 
An important point to grasp in this perspective is that taxation systems are systems. This means 
that their elements are interdependent so that the alteration of one component is likely to trigger 
a domino effect that will affect others, all linked in the revenue side of the budgetary constraint 
of the State. The important idea here is that it is not necessary that all elements of taxation sys-
tems face downward pressure for all elements to be affected by a downward pressure on one of 
them.  
 
The central hypothesis that this section will try to prove is that capital mobility in the EU has 
triggered a spectacular fall in corporate taxation that in turn has triggered a spectacular fall in 
high-income taxation that in turn has affected personal income taxation and eventually the rela-
tive tax burdens put on capital and labor. This systemic effect has been reinforced by the exis-
tence of a strong European constraint on fiscal balance and by a “yardstick competition” be-
tween states (see infra). Capital mobility in the EU thus acts, through the systemic logic, on taxa-
tion systems and eventually on redistribution. The second part of the dynamic is that these re-
lated processes have to be differentiated according to their impact on social models. 
 
As argued in Section 1 (see Chart III), capital is highly mobile in the EU, more than anywhere 
else in the world, including at the global level. In turn, the reduction of corporate taxation this 
mobility has triggered has been more important than anywhere else in the world.16  
 
One way to measure this is to look at the reduction in statutory corporate taxation in the EU 
from 1979 to 2005 (see Chart XI). 
                                                          
 
Capital mobility, corporate taxation, high-income taxation, income taxation, total taxation 
 
The golden rule of taxation established by Ramsey (1927) states that the higher the price elastici-
ty of a factor, the less it should be taxed (“inverse elasticity rule”). In consequence, factors of pro-
duction should be taxed according to their mobility. The more
m
ones.  
 
If one assumes that European states are tax revenue maximizing “Leviathans,”15 then general-
ized social-tax competition, i.e., on all factors because all are mobile, is bound to be efficient. But 
partial social-tax competition of the type d
c
from mobile to immobile factors (see Apolte, 2001).  
 
Instead of Leviathans, it is assumed that European states are “intelligent dinosaurs” which tend 
slowly to adapt their tax structures and strategy in order to survive. In other words, European 
governments do need tax revenue and are willing to tax the most easily available sources in or-
der to accumulate it. They also must respect their constituencies’ preference
a
15See Brennan & Buchanan (1980).  
16For a demonstration of the link between capital mobility and reduction in corporate taxation, see 
Krogstrup (2003) and Ganghof (2006). 
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But, as is well known, a reduction of nominal tax rates (statutory) may imply an actual increase 
in tax bases so that tax revenues remain constant (or even increase) and effective taxation re-
 com-
e to look for a 
mains unchanged. Indeed, a fall in tax rates is designed to attract more capital. Because tax
petition “cleans its footprints” by enlarging the tax base after a tax rate cut, we hav
reduction in effective corporate taxation, taking into account this base effect. The result is no less 
impressive (see Chart XI) and allows us to concentrate on statutory tax rates.17  
 
Chart XI. CORPORATE TAXATION IN OECD AND THE EU 
                                        Statutory corporate tax rates in 19 OECD countries 
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Effective average corporate tax rates in 19 OECD countries 
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Source: updated database from Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith and A. Klemm (2002), “Corporate income tax 
reforms and international tax competition” Economic Policy 35: 451-495, accessed at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210
                                                          
17For methodological choices between average statutory, average effective and marginal tax rates, see 
Devereux, Griffith & Klemm (2002). 
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Table II shows that the fall in statutory rates is the strongest among the other OECD countries 
considered, both in terms of average and standard deviation. 
 
Table II. STATUTORY CORPORATE TAXATION IN OECD AND THE EU* 
 
Average OECD  
non-EU 
Average EU 
 
St. dev. OECD 
non-EU 
St. dev. EU 
 
1979 0,49 ,48 0,04 0 0,10 
1980 0,10 0,49 0,48 0,03 
1981 0,50 0,44 0,04 0,16 
1982 0,47 0,48 0,07 0,15 
1983 0,47 0,48 0,07 0,14 
1984 0,47 0,48 0,07 0,14 
1985 0,48 0,47 0,07 0,14 
1986 0,48 0,46 0,07 0,14 
1987 0,45 0,44 0,08 0,13 
1988 0,43 0,44 0,08 0,13 
1989 0,42 0,41 0,07 0,13 
1990 0,42 0,38 0,07 0,11 
1991 0,42 0,37 0,07 0,11 
1992 0,38 0,37 0,07 0,11 
1993 0,37 0,36 0,08 0,12 
1994 0,37 0,35 0,08 0,11 
1995 0,37 0,36 0,07 0,12 
1996 0,37 0,36 0,07 0,12 
1997 0,37 0,36 0,07 0,12 
1998 0,36 0,35 0,06 0,10 
1999 0,36 0,35 0,05 0,10 
2000 0,35 0,34 0,05 0,10 
2001 0,35 0,33 0,05 0,08 
2002 0,35 0,33 0,05 0,08 
2003 0,35 0,32 0,05 0,07 
2004 0,34 0,32 0,05 0,07 
2005 0,34 0,30 0,05 0,07 
*EU is the EU 15 minus Luxemburg and Denmark. OECD non-EU is the U.S., Switzerland, Norway, Japan, 
Australia and Canada. 
Source: updated database from Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith and A. Klemm (2002), “Corporate income tax 
reforms and international tax competition” Economic Policy 35: 451-495, accessed at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210 and author’s calculations. 
 
The overall result of this downward competition in terms of corporate taxation is shown in 
Chart XII. According to the latest KPMG Corporate Tax Survey (KPMG, 2006), the EU now has the 
lowest corporate taxation of all regions in the world.  
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Chart XII. CORPORATE TAXATION: HOW THE EU COMPARES TO THE WORLD 
Statutory corporate tax rate in 2006
in %
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Source: KPMG (2006) an calculat
One reason for this dramatic result is obviously act that the EU 10 exhibits a er corpor-
ate taxation o erage than EU 15. Yet, on ain, the popular East-West race to the bot-
tom perspective would be misleading. European competition on orate taxatio ginated in 
p
 
How d 05a), it 
h-income taxation in the EU 15 seems to have followed a similar path to corporate 
taxation (Chart XIII). Here also the reduction ha  been impressive: from 66 percent in 1979 to 51 
percent in 1993 and to 49 percent in 2003. 
 
d author’s ions. 
 
 the f small
n av  the ce ag
 corp n ori
what is now the EU 15 as early as 1986, not in the EU 10, which most likely followed the trend in 
preparation for accession (as shown in Chart X) rather than set the tone. The overall low Euro-
ean corporate tax rate can thus be said to result from a dynamic triggered in the “old” EU.  
oes corporate taxation connect to high-income taxation? Following Ganghof (20
can be argued that corporate taxation is tightly linked to high-income taxation by the systemic 
logic. The latter implies that personal income can be converted into corporate income if the taxa-
tion gap between the two is too large. Hence, one has to closely follow the other. 
 
Indeed, hig
s
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Ch E art XIII.  HIGH INCOME TAXATION IN THE EU AND CORPORATE VS TOP INCOM
Top marginal personal income tax rate in the EU, 1979-2003 
in %
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Note: series jump from 1999 to 2003 but data are homogenous.  
Source: 1979-1999: OECD, table accessed at Tax Policy Center, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/home/; 
2003:  Conseil national des impôts, 2004, La Concurrence fiscale et l’entreprise, http://www.ccomptes.fr
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ext, one has to look more closely at the N apparent relation between high-income and corporate 
taxation. As suggested by the basic regression shown in Chart XIII, the two dynamics seem very 
closely coupled. However, in this relation between corporate taxation and high-income taxation, 
one has to consider an alternative or compleme  that high-income taxa-ntary hypothesis, namely
 25 
tion ha e that 
skilled labor is more mobile than unskilled labor, but it is far less mobile than capital. So the ef-
fect of mobility on high-income taxation is much more likely to be triggered by the possibility to 
convert wage income into capital income than by the possibility to escape personal income taxa-
tion by geographical exit.  
 
In both corporate and high-income taxation cases, a consistent chronological sequence emerges. 
The two turning points (logically) appear to be the launching of the Single Market from 1986 on, 
and that of the single currency, from 1999 onwards. Those two sequences (the first one being 
stronger than the second) prove to be of general relevance in the development of social-tax com-
petition in the European community and then the EU.  
 
The effect on personal income taxation also follows this pattern, as shown in Chart XIV. 
 
Chart XIV. TAXES ON PERSONAL INCOME 1975 TO 2003 IN THE EU 
In% of GDP 
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
s fallen in response to the increased mobility of high-skilled labor. It is certainly tru
Austria 6.8 7.0 7.9 9.0 9.4 8.3 8.6 9.5 9.9 9.9 
Belgium 6.4 8.7 13.2 15.4 16.2 13.8 14.6 14.3 14.6 14.3 
Denmark 12.4 19.1 22.4 22.9 23.9 25.4 26.6 25.9 26.1 25.6 
Finland 10.1 12.5 14.3 13.0 15.0 15.4 14.3 14.7 14.3 13.9 
France 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.7 4.9 4.5 4.9 8.0 7.5 7.6 
Germany 8.2 8.6 10.6 11.1 10.7 9.8 10.2 9.4 8.9 8.5 
Greece 1.4 2.2 1.9 3.6 4.0 4.1 3.9 5.6 5.1 4.9 
Ireland 4.2 5.3 7.3 10.0 11.0 10.7 10.1 9.6 7.5 7.9 
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
Italy 2.8 2.8 4.0 7.0 9.2 10.2 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.8 
Luxembourg 6.9 6.4 10.3 11.0 11.5 9.6 9.2 7.4 6.7 7.1 
Netherlands 9.1 9.5 11.2 11.4 8.3 10.6 7.9 6.2 7.2 6.9 
Portugal      4.6 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.8 
Spain 2.1 1.8 2.6 4.6 5.3 7.0 7.5 6.5 6.7 6.5 
Sweden 17.1 19.2 19.4 19.4 18.7 20.5 16.2 17.7 15.2 15.8 
UK 10.1 11.7 14.1 10.3 9.8 10.7 10.0 11.0 10.6 10.2 
EU15 7.2 8.5 10.2 11.0 11.3 11.0 10.7 10.8 10.5 10.4 
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Source : OECD. 
 26 
The final effect of this dynamic on total tax revenues, showed on Chart XV, is apparently mixed 
since revenues appear to be more or less stable, despite these dramatic evolutions.  
 
Chart XV.  TOTAL TAX REVENUE FROM 1975 TO 2003 IN THE EU 
                                                                                                                                                       In% of GDP 
 1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
Austria 36.7 40.9 39.6 41.1 42.6 43.6 43.1 
Belgium 40.6 45.6 43.2 44.8 45.7 46.2 45.4 
Denmark 40.0 47.4 47.7 49.5 50.1 48.7 48.3 
Finland 36.8 40.2 44.3 46.0 48.0 45.8 44.8 
France 35.5 42.4 42.2 42.9 44.4 43.4 43.4 
Germany 35.3 37.2 35.7 37.2 37.2 35.4 35.5 
Greece 21.8 28.6 29.3 32.4 38.2 37.1 35.7 
Ireland 29.1 35.0 33.5 32.8 32.2 28.7 29.7 
Italy .5 43.1 26.1 34.4 38.9 41.2 43.2 42
Luxembourg 37.5 45.1 40.8 42.3 40.6 41.3 41.3 
Neth ands .9 4  38erl 41.3 42.8 42.9 41  1.2 39.2 .8 
Portugal 20.8 26.6 3.6 36 37. 29.2 3 .4 36.5 
Spain 18.2 26 1.8 3  34.9 .9 32.1 3 4.8 34.8
 1975 198 2 2 2005 1990 1995 000 200 3 
Sweden 8.5 5  50.6 42.0 48.2 53.2 4 3.9 50.1
UK 35.3 37.7 5.1 37 35.6 36.5 3 .5 35.6 
EU15 33.1 38 0.1 4 40.5 .6 39.3 4 1.7 40.6 
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Source: OECD. 
 
Hence, we have to look for a distribution effect inside the taxation system to follow with the 
logic of our investigation, i.e., for a dynamic of the respective tax burdens placed on the different 
factors of production.  
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The dynamic of tax burdens 
 
ne first has to understand the taxation structure in the EU (as shown in Chart XVI) in ordeO r to 
grasp the im xation systems.  
 
Chart AXATION STRUCTURE AND DYNAMIC IN THE EU  
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Source: OECD and author’s calculations. 
 
A first glance at what happened to mobile and immobile elements of taxation is taken in the sec-
ond table of Chart XVI. It seems that, in line with the framework set in the previous section, the 
tax burden has shifted in the EU from mobile to immobile components, but in a small measure. 
But more precise empirical evidence concerning the respective taxation of mobile and immobile 
elements between 1986 and our time is available and the story here also seems to unfold in two 
stages.  
 
The first dynamic occurred between 1986 and 1993 and was analyzed by the European Commis-
sion itself. The European Commission (1996) noted that “while the taxation of labour has been 
increasing, the taxation of factors of pro r than labour has shown an overall de-
rease” and that “the stability of total tax revenues has been achieved at the cost of a progressive 
duction othe
c
alteration in the structure of taxation: the tax burden has been shifted to the less mobile tax base 
- labour - in order to recover the tax lost from the erosion of other more mobile bases.” The Euro-
 28 
pean Commission estimates that “[B]etween 1980 and 1993, the implicit tax rate18 on employed 
The European rs … the implicit tax 
rate on employed labour has increased by more , whereas the same rate 
for other factors atural resources) has de-
creased by more than 10 percen of this evolution is repro-
duced in Chart XVII. 
 
The second graphic represents t x burdens from the introduction of the euro on-
wards as empirically estimated by Eurostat. If, here again, the dynamic appears to have been 
more important between 1986 a rly been forced between 1999 and 2003. 
 
Given this general evolution w y of capital ffected capital taxation and even-
tually the relative tax burdens placed on immobile and mobile bases of taxation systems in the 
EU, we now have to differentiate the final impact on member states’ social policies. 
 
Chart XVII. IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON LABOR AND OTHER FACTORS, THEN AND NOW 
 
labour for the Community as a whole grew by about one fifth while the same indicator for other 
factors of production - mainly self-employed labour and capital – decreased by more than a 
tenth.” 
 
 Commission (1997) similarly stated that “over the last 15 yea
than 7 percentage points
of production (capital, self-employed labour, energy, n
tage points.” A graphic representation 
he evolution of ta
nd 1995, it has clea  rein
hereby mobilit has a
 
Source: European Commission (1997). 
 
                                                          
18“From a macroeconomics point of view, a tax rate is calculated by dividing the revenues from taxes on a 
special activity or good by an appropriate corresponding aggregate tax base from national accounts 
statistics. This yields the implicit tax rate (ITR), sometimes also referred to as an average or effective tax 
rate.” Source: Coded, Eurostat, http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/coded/info/data/coded/en.htm
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How size matters in races to bottoms 
 
Country size,19 first studied by Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991), plays an important role in 
social-tax competition. Dehejia and Genschel (1999) describe the issue of the size of the tax base 
as a trade-off between the loss of domestic revenue and the gain of foreign revenue resulting 
from a reduction in taxation. The smaller the country, the more the trade-off leans toward lower 
rates and pushes for tax competition. Another reason why small countries tax capital less is that 
small countries can get away much more easily than large ones in terms of retaliation. Hence, 
small countries will have more interest in taxing capital less. The larger the country, the smaller 
the pressure to tax capital less.  
 
This explains why large countries have on average higher corporate taxation than small coun-
tries in the EU (see Chart XI). Another way to put it is to stress that the effect of tax competition 
is more severe on small economies than on large ones when both compete, since small econo-
mies will witness higher losses of per capita capital than large economies.  
 
In this respect, Kanbur and Keen (1993) argue and show “that differences in (country) size exac-
erbate the inefficiencies of non cooperative behavior” in taxation. It will be argued in the next 
subsection that this line of reasoning is true in the EU, but in a different way tha  intended by 
the authors. Small countries ac ve to cooperate among them-
elves in terms of taxation than large ones within social models.  
 
n
tually appear to have more incenti
s
 
 
 
                                                          
19 For a more general argument on the “size nexus” in the EU, see Laurent & Le Cacheux (2006).  
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Social tops and bottoms in the EU 
 
As noted earlier, social-tax compacts differ in the EU but they differ in similar ways. National 
social-tax systems can be grouped under “model” characterization and the fundamental objec-
tives of the non-residual models are not the same (see Chart XVIII).  
 
The “continental” model (closer to Bismarck’s ideal) was designed to safeguard the income of 
workers. The “Nordic” model (closer to Beveridge’s vision) aims at guaranteeing equality be-
tween citizens. The “eastern” model has no explicit objective, but one can safely assume that it 
will fulfill its vocation if it manages to contain inequalities during the catch-up phase, thus 
limiting the strain put on democracy in the EU 10. Because I assume that these models pursue 
those specific objectives, I assess their performance on this basis. 
 
The general effect in terms of taxation and tax burdens shifting will first be differentiated be-
tween the different models. It will be shown that the “Nordic” group, made up of small coun-
tries, better resists to competition in terms of efficiency but with serious consequence in terms of 
income inequalities. Within the “continental” model, the consequence is felt through the down-
ward pressure put on wages given the tax burden on labor and the development of “social de-
valuation” policies. Finally, within the eastern model, the consequence of capital mobility is felt 
through potentially explosive inequalities.  
 
In assessing the dynamic of competition or cooperation, one should keep in mind that social-tax 
competition within social models is driven pr mobility of factors (“competition à la 
obility of information, i.e., a competition driven by compari-
on, anticipation or imitation (“yardstick competition”, see Salmon, 2005). 
i arily by m
Tiebout”) but also secondarily by m
s
 
Chart XVIII. NON-RESIDUAL SOCIAL-TAX COMPACTS IN THE EU: CONTRASTING OBJECTIVES 
 
    “NORDIC”“CONTINENTAL
”
       “EASTERN” 
 
Top(s) 
Guarantee Guarantee Contain inequalities 
workers income during catch-up equality between 
citizens
Low wages, high 
unemployment,  
 
Rising income 
 
 
ExpBottom(s) 
inequalities declining unemployment 
benefits 
losive inequalities 
during catch-up 
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The race to the bottom within the “continental” model 
dding the macroeconomic constraint to the picture of social-tax competition is crucial. Large 
Chart XIX. : B ’  
 
economic 
generally abided by the 
European r ry and exchange 
 
The general dynamic of the competition within member states belonging to the “continental” 
model is shown in Chart XIX. 
 
A
states need macroeconomic stabilization more than small ones (see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2006). 
States actually try to use exchange-rate, monetary or fiscal policy to avoid the effects of social-tax 
competition while competing efficiently for mobile factors. When those instruments are no 
longer available because they are seriously constrained, large states can resort to competition 
through social model in lieu of competition through exchange-rate. 
 
 RACE TO THE BOTTOM WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL MODEL  ISMARCK S DEMISE
 
Capital mobility Policy constraint
European asymmetric integration
 
Chart XX shows in this respect that continental economies are not using their macro
policies to counter the pressure of social-tax competition. They have 
ules on budgetary policy (more than OECD countries), while moneta
Corporate taxation goes down
High-income taxation goes down 
Consumption taxation goes up
Labor taxation goes up
Wages growth goes down
Workers revenue goes down
 No harmonization
 SGP/no exchange rate 
Labor immobility
No demand 
management 
Unemployment goes up
“Social devaluation:”
Social policy used as a competitiveness policy 
Unemployment benefits go down
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rate policy have been, because of the nature of the European economic constitution, price-
mpete not only for capital but also for trade, i.e., export shares. 
stabilization oriented and not output-stabilization oriented (see Laurent & Le Cacheux 2006).  
 
In addition, large countries co
The increase in intra-EU trade flows can here also lead to social (and not exchange rate) “dis-
inflation” policies in order to capture closely structured economies’ partners/rivals shares. This 
competition can lead to wage moderation and unemployment benefits reduction, as is the case 
between France, Germany and Italy. 
 
Chart XX. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE EURO AREA 
General government financial balance, surplus or deficit 
as % of nominal GDP
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Source: ECD. 
have been reduced between 1992 and 2002 in large continental economies. During that period, 
O
  
Eurostat data show that, even without taking into account the severe reforms implemented be-
tween 2002 and 2006, unemployment benefits, in terms of percentage of total social benefits, 
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while unemployment rates increased in Germany (from 5.7 percent to 7.6 percent) and Italy 
(from 8.8 percent to 9.1 percent) and slightly decreased in France (from 10.4 percent to 9 per-
ent), Germany has witnessed a decrease of unemployment benefits from 9.7 percent to 8.5 per-
 
The impact on “co trated in Chart XXI where 
the euro area stands for continental economies. It is shown to display an important and persis-
tent gap throughout the 1990s with the OECD and other EU member states. This gap cannot be 
explained by a corresponding gap in productivity, not before the very last period. It is thus more 
likely to be related to the weight of the tax burden put on labor as a consequence of capital 
mobility.  
 
Chart XXI. RACE TO THE BOTTOM WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL MODEL: IMPACT ON WAGES 
c
cent, France a decrease from 8.9 percent to 7.6 percent and Italy a decrease from 3 percent to 1.7 
percent. Controlling for composition effects, the OECD 2006 Employment Outlook shows that Ger-
many and France have followed the organization’s restrictive policy reform recommendations 
over the period 1994-200420 in terms of duration, and to a lesser degree of replacement rates of 
unemployment benefits.  
ntinental” wages is much more spectacular, as illus
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Source: OECD. 
                                                          
20Known as the OECD “Jobs Strategy.” 
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Labour productivity in the business sector
change in % from previous period
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The race to the bottom within the “Nordic” model 
 
As argued in Ganghof (2006), two strategies of capital taxation are possible for welfare states: 
“Large welfare states seem to require moderate capital taxation. Moderation can be achieved in 
two ways: shifting the tax burden onto payroll taxes and indirect consumption taxes (low in-
come taxation) or privileging capital income within the income tax (differentiated income taxa-
tion).”  
 
As shown in Chart XXV (cf. infra), the “Nordic” countries have by and large opted for the second 
solution and implemented dual income taxation during the 1990s.21 The dynamic of the coopera-
tive race to the bottom within the “Nordic” model is shown in Chart XXII.  
 
An important qualification in this respect must me made. “Nordic” countries were not all mem-
bers of the EU when they decided on this taxation reform (only Denmark was, while Norway 
still isn’t). Yet, dual income taxation reforms can be seen, as can the “flat tax” in Eastern coun-
tries, as a necessary adaptation to the EU market of capital. The fact that all Nordic countries are 
small played a major role in the implementation f a cooperative tax harmonization (see previ-
ous subsection). Since neither of them  capital mobility but none of them had to fear 
retaliation, the process of yardstick cooperation was able to fully play (see Chart XXV). If the re-
sult in terms of efficiency of the tax system is impressive, the outcome in terms of income ine-
qualities and redistribution seems more dubious. As shown in Chart XXIII, income inequalities 
have actually risen significantly in “Nordic” countries (although they exhibit levels of inequali-
ties that are still the lowest in the EU and for that matter in the world) since the second half of 
the 1990s, while they have remained constant in the EU, whether limited to “continental” coun-
tries (more or less the euro area) or taken as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 o
 could resist
entation and Ganghof (2005b) for the specific case of Denmark. 21 See Cnossen (2002) for a general pres
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Chart XXII. RACE TO THE BOTTOM WITHIN THE NORDIC MODEL: BEVERIDGE’ S DEMISE 
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Chart XXIII. RACE TO THE BOTTOM WITHIN THE NORDIC 
IMPACT ON INCOME INEQUALITIES 
Inequality of income distribution (income quintile share ratio) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
EU15 4,7 4,6 4,6 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,6 
EU12 4,7 4,5 4,5 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,5 
Finland 3 3,1 3,4 3,3 3,7 3,7 3,6 
Sweden 3 3 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,3 3,3 
Norway 3,3 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,5 3,2 3,8 
Denmark 2,9 2,9 3 3 3 3 3,6 
Note: Income quintile share ratio is the ratio of total income received by the 20 percent of the population 
with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20  percent of the population with the lowest 
income (lowest quintile). Income must be understood as equivalized disposable income. 
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Income inequality in the EU and the Nordic model countries, 1997-2003
 Income quintile share ratio
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Source: Eurostat. 
  
Brandolini & Smeeding (2006) using not Eurostat data but Luxembourg income study data reach 
the same conclusion, but only for Sweden and Finland, which in the mid-1990s display a sharp 
increase in income inequalities and a corresp
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Chart XXIV. RACE TO THE BOTTOM WITHIN THE EASTERN MODEL: LENIN’ S DEMISE 
 
 
 are small, the logic of competition seems stronger 
ave, have competed 
on the rate of the flat tax.  
 
European asymmetric integration
Capital mobility
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Absolute inequality between citizens
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Despite the fact that most Eastern countries
among them than the logic of cooperation. Not all countries have implemented a “flat tax” and 
those which haven’t so far are under pressure to do so. Moreover, as shown in Chart XXV, the 
contrast between Nordic and Eastern countries is striking. While Nordic countries have imple-
mented very similar dual income taxation system (in terms of taxation principle and rates), East-
ern countries of the first wave of “flat tax” and even more of the second w
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Chart XXV. TAXATION WITHIN THE NORDIC AND EASTERN MODEL 
Dual income taxation in within the “Nordic” model  
xation on labor 
(min/max) 
 Year of 
introduction 
Rate of taxation of 
corporate profits 
Rate of taxation on 
other capital income 
Rate of ta
Sweden 19 28/56 91 28 30 
Norway 28/47,5  1992 28 28 
Finl ,5/52,5 and 1993 29 29 30
Source: Cnossen (2002). 
 
Flat tax in the “new” Europe  
 Year of 
introduction 
Rate 
Estonia 1994 26 
Lithuania 1994 33 
Latvia 1995 25 
Slovakia 2004 19 
Romania 2005 16 
Source: “The case for flat taxes,” The Economist, April 14, 2005. 
  
The race to the top within the liberal model 
has so far been left out of the general framework of European “races to bo
dual one. The reason is that within the liberal model, the process at play would bes
a race to the top. As shown earlier in Chart XI, Ireland has from t
 
One model ttoms,” the 
liberal or resi t 
be characterized as 
on. 
 
                                                          
he very be-
ginning of the Single Market opted for a “free rider” strategy with respect to corporate taxati
Combined with trade and financial openness and the advantage of country size,22 Ireland has 
become the EU success story and stands for one of the most spectacular economic catch-ups of 
the contemporary period. The dynamic of the “race to the top” within the liberal model and the 
result in terms of GDP per capita catch-up between Ireland and the U.K. is shown in Chart XXVI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22Again, see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2006. 
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Chart XXVI.  S TRIUMPH  RACE TO THE TOP WITHIN THE LIBERAL MODEL: IRELAND AND MILL’
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Source: A. Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003). 
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he consequence in terms of tax burden put on labor, wage and social benefits mod-
ration. However, as shown by the case of Ireland, the degree to which social-tax competition is 
inefficient depends on country size. Nordic and Eastern countries are certainly heading in a 
wrong direction given the objective of their social-tax competition, but not in terms of growth or 
unemployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
egrity and efficiency 
The general framework, that this paper has tried to substantiate, explaining why th
rary period of European integration is associated with a demise and not a rise of the wel
as in the first globalization (Chart XXVII). 
It is now possible (and necessary) to present a normative perspective on this state 
affairs. Indeed, since it has been argued that European competition acts as a cons
ber states’ redistribution policies, it is legitimate to formulate two criteria for 
integrity and efficiency.23  
When constitutional provisions are explicitly chosen and written (as for the economic provisions
of the European economic constitution), they also entail revision rules. Hence, revi
riterion of integrity. When provisions are implicit, as is the case with the kind of inform
rules this paper is concerned with, integrity simply means neutrality. Neutrality ca
as the preservation of the social justice and redistribution principles embedded in na
hey are validated through regular elections by citizens. This criterion 
adow Social Europe” is concerned. 
In terms of efficiency,24 it is impossible to decide a priori if tax competition is beneficial or harm-
ful. It depends on a number of factors, among which consumers’ mobility is the most important 
(see Brueckner, 2004). If this criterion is not met, i.e., if consumers/workers are trap
tem where their labor is heavily taxed to finance social policies, then the good side 
tion (“à la Tiebout”) is much more difficult to find. In the case of social-tax
have defined it, the efficiency criterion is also clearly not satisfied within the
mies given t
e
23For a definition
 In the tax competition literature, efficiency has a very precise meaning. A tax system is deemed efficient if it 
oes not distort, i.e., is neutral to, investment decisions. I refer to a much broader definition of rules 
fficiency, namely upward convergence in welfare, see Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006).  
 and discussion of those criteria, see Laurent & Le Cacheux (2006).  
24
d
e
 41 
Chart XXVII. EUROPEAN RACES TO BOTTOMS: A SCENARIO 
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25In the tax competition literature, efficiency has a very precise meaning. A tax system is deemed efficient 
if it does not distort, i.e., is neutral to, investment decisions. I refer to a much broader definition of rules 
efficiency, namely upward convergence in welfare, see Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006).  
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VI.  The future of 
 
ocial-tax competition. The first is to create a common tax on capital (see Le Cacheux et al., 1998). 
European inequalities and public policy dilemmas  
If one follows Piketty & Saez (2006), the future of European inequalities looks bright. The au-
thors show that the reduction of inequality in the postwar period was essentially the product of 
the “accident” of world wars on capital revenues and of the prolongation of this accident’s con-
sequence through welfare programs and progressive tax systems (especially estate taxation). In a 
world where skilled labor but mostly capital are more mobile than ever and manage to alter wel-
fare states’ objectives, inequalities (now more driven in difference in wages than in capital reve-
nues) are bound to rise sharply. The policy issue at the European level is thus crucial. 
 
In this respect, given the depth of European integration and the superficiality of European gov-
ernance, it could be argued that the EU at the present moment is a constitution without a sover-
eign. How to restore some efficiency and integrity into the social provisions of the European eco-
nomic constitution?  
 
The first solution would be to lower capital mobility and/or to raise labor mobility. For reasons 
too numerous to list, both solutions are unlikely, so that an indirect public policy might appear 
more efficient. 
 
Tax harmonization and coordination in the EU is a complex and well documented issue (see 
Cnossen, 2003 for an overview). One (apparent) paradox has been the fact that harmonization 
has made progress where it was less needed (e.g. the VAT). Another paradox is that the project 
under consideration in the EU as these lines are written, the “Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base” (CCCTB), could actually end up fostering tax competition even more rather than reduc-
ing the incentive for it. 
 
The literature on tax competition generally recognizes that most of the inefficiencies that emerge 
due to the immobility of labor and mobility of capital can be offset by two means (see Brueckner, 
2004). One is to agree to levy a common tax on capital (because then the choice of location for 
capital becomes indifferent). The other is to agree to finance in common public policies (because 
then the local under-provision of public goods becomes impossible).  
 
The EU thus faces essentially three policy choices if it is to counter the damaging effects of 
s
The second is to start a deliberation on “European public goods” in order to create a budget for 
common policies (see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2005). Finally, euro area countries should create a 
macroeconomic cooperative framework (first advocated in Fitoussi, 1995) in order to reduce the 
incentive for “social devaluation” within the “continental” model.  
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VII.  Epilogue: invisible races to bottoms 
 
Alice looked round her in great surprise. ‘Why, I do believe we've been under this tree the 
whole time!  Everything’s just as it was!’ 
 ‘Of course it is,’ said the Queen, ‘what would you have it?’ 
 ‘Well, in OUR country,’ said Alice, still panting a little, ‘you’d generally get to somewhere 
else - if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been doing.’ 
 
‘A slow sort of country!’ said the Queen. ‘Now, HERE, you see, it takes all the running 
 
uropean welfare states are presently in Alice’s uncomfortable situation. While they try to con-
lber & Standing (2000) note in this respect that “the distinction between erosion and arrested 
 European welfare state.  
                                                          
YOU can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at 
least twice as fast as that!’ 
 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1871), Chapter II. 
E
tain the impact on social policies of the asymmetric and damaging integration process they put 
in motion, new social risks appear and develop. Hacker (2004) makes a similar point for the U.S.. 
 
A
development corresponds to one between non-decisions (by which governments abstain from in-
troducing or expanding protective legislation) and decisions (by which they dismantle schemes).”  
 
The literature on the rise of new social risks26 (associated with youth, women, poverty, the new 
service economy…) points precisely to the idea that erosion and arrested development go hand 
in hand in the embattled
26See Taylor-Gooby (2004). 
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